


Peergos: Capability-Based Access Control for an Encrypted Web

Dr Ian Preston
Co-founder, CEO



The web is under attack

- ~~empower people~~
- ~~improve lives~~
- ~~protect democracy~~
- surveillance
- control
- coercion

A better foundation

- E2EE
- host independent
- self-sovereign identity
- protect metadata, including social graph

Peergos: a protocol for agency

- Global, E2EE social filesystem
- Fine-grained access control
- Signed content-addressed (host independent)
- Automatic host migration (preserving links)
- Sandboxed apps/sites
- Portable, self-sovereign identity




PEERGOS

The server is an adversary

1. Content-addressed data
2. Signed updates
3. End-to-end encryption

→ location independent addressing (host independence)

Signed merkle forest



Signed merkle forest



id



w1




w2



w3


Signed merkle forest



id



w1



w2



w3

CHAMP

- compressed hash-array mapped prefix-trie
- key value store
- independent of insertion order (unlike btree)
- balanced


Keys are random 32 bytes

Values are cryptree nodes (encrypted metadata)

Each cryptree node can link to 5 encrypted blocks

Immutable state - file system CHAMP

File system CHAMP



Cryptree metadata privacy

Host cannot see:

- file sizes
- file vs dir
- file/folder names
- folder topology
- social graph
- who or how many have access to a file/blob.

Capabilities and Access Control

Capabilities (Caps)

- Pure information, not identity-based
- Works in secret links etc.
- Can be revoked

MIRROR

(Owner, Writer, map key, BAT)

+


(read key)

+


(write key)

WRITE

Read Cryptree



Write Cryptree



Fast file seeking

How do we get cap to later chunks of a file?

mapkey => sha256(stream-secret + mapkey)

bat => sha256(stream-secret + bat)

1. local hashing
2. a single champ.get to retrieve the encrypted metadata
3. up to 5 block.get calls for fragments

DEMO

Fast seeking within a movie

Websites and Applications

Exfiltration-proof apps

- run untrusted code over private data
- an app can't exfiltrate data
- an app can't read anything it's not granted access to
- works in existing browsers, without add-ons
- simple REST API (without a server!)

Application authoring

- just a folder of HTML5
- author controls visibility
- basic permissions (e.g. register for certain file types)
- frictionless publishing - drag and drop
- 0 permissions = private website


Application sandbox

OS process 1

peergos.net

OS process 2


bafy.peergos.net



What can an app do?

Edit files


- Word processor



What can an app do?

Edit files

- Word processor
- Spreadsheets




The screenshot shows a spreadsheet application window titled "LuckySheet". The title bar includes standard icons for file, edit, and view, along with a logo and the application name. The main interface features a toolbar with various icons for file operations, text styling, and data manipulation. The spreadsheet itself is titled "HOUSE CLEANING CHECKLIST" in bold capital letters. The structure is a table with three columns: "DONE" (containing a list of cleaning tasks), "MONTHLY CLEANING" (containing a list of tasks), and "NOTES" (containing empty rows for notes). The tasks listed in the "DONE" column are: Dust ceiling fans, Dust ceilings and wall corners, Clean walls and light fixtures, Clean window coverings, Vacuum under furniture and cushions, Clean inside of windows, window sills, Check smoke detectors, Deep clean appliances, Clean rangehood and fan filter, and Defrost freezer. The "MONTHLY CLEANING" column lists: Dust ceiling fans, Dust ceilings and wall corners, Clean walls and light fixtures, Clean window coverings, Vacuum under furniture and cushions, Clean inside of windows, window sills, Check smoke detectors, Deep clean appliances, Clean rangehood and fan filter, and Defrost freezer. The "NOTES" column contains empty rows for notes. The bottom of the spreadsheet shows a navigation bar with tabs for "Daily", "Weekly", "Monthly" (which is selected), and "Seasonal", along with other controls like "Count:1" and zoom settings.

HOUSE CLEANING CHECKLIST		
DONE	MONTHLY CLEANING	NOTES
	Dust ceiling fans	
	Dust ceilings and wall corners	
	Clean walls and light fixtures	
	Clean window coverings	
8	Vacuum under furniture and cushions	
9	Clean inside of windows, window sills	
10	Check smoke detectors	
11	Deep clean appliances	
12	Clean rangehood and fan filter	
13	Defrost freezer	

What can an app do?

Edit files

- Word processor
- Spreadsheets
- Image editor



What can an app do?

Edit files

- Word processor
- Spreadsheets
- Image editor
- Markdown editor

The screenshot shows a user interface for editing files, specifically a Markdown editor. At the top is a toolbar with various icons for bold, italic, underline, and other document operations. Below the toolbar, the word "Markdown" is displayed in bold. A horizontal line separates this from the content area. The content area contains a list of items:

- item 1
- item-2
- ticked

Below the list is a table with two columns:

Column 1	Column 2
left	right

Further down is a code editor containing the following JavaScript code:


```
function hello() {  
  console.log('Hello World!');  
}
```

On the right side of the code editor is a small text input field with the word "text" and a pencil icon. At the bottom of the content area, there are two links: "Sintel trailer" and "Plans". At the very bottom of the interface, there are two buttons: "Markdown" and "WYSIWYG".

What can an app do?

Edit files

- Word processor
- Spreadsheets
- Image editor
- Markdown editor
- Tiddlywiki notebooks




What else can an app do?

- Media player



What else can an app do?

- Media player
- Multiplayer games



What else can an app do?

- Media player
- Multiplayer games
- Chat



What else can an app do?

- Media player
- Multiplayer games
- Chat
- Doom



More example apps:
github.com/peergos/example-apps

DEMO

Some apps

Social media

- most social media is bad for society
 - Allows micro targeted political profiling
 - Designed to be addictive
- normal in-person conversations are good for society
- Peergos social media is modelled on in-person conversations

Social feed

Newsfeed

New Post

demo

September 20, 2021

Batman
20/09/2021

Holiday time!

 Comment

Spider-Man
Batman, you do realise that there are geotags in those photos, so everyone knows where you are now!

 Reply

Batman
No worries, that was a week ago :-)


 Reply

 Write a comment

UPGRADE

Without privacy, there can be no democracy.

Have fun!



1. Self host, or sign up: peergos.net
2. Write your own apps
3. Protect yourself and democracy

Questions?

Dr Ian Preston

ian@peergos.org

peergos.org

@peergos

"The defence of privacy will be the saviour of the future."

**- Gus Hosein,
Executive Director Privacy International**

Block Access Tokens (BATs)

- Don't put encrypted data in public!
- Post-quantum ciphertext access control
- 2 BATs per block
- Send S3 V4 sig (89 bytes) with hash
- Tied to requesting peer-id and time
- Recipient verifies signature against requesting peer-id and the BAT



Inline BATs

- BAT = 32 random bytes

```
{  
  "bats" : [inline BAT, mirror BAT ID],  
CBOR :  
  .  
  .  
  }
```

RAW	8 byte magic prefix	77 byte cbor list(inline BAT, mirror BAT ID)	8 KiB - 1 MiB block data
-----	------------------------	----------------------------------------------------	-----------------------------

Why is privacy so important?

- Fundamental human right

"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence."

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Necessary for democracy

Without privacy:

- Mass surveillance
- Monitoring and crushing dissent
- Voter manipulation from profiling
- Swinging elections

What happens when you visit a website?

- DNS lookup
- TLS connection (trust 140 CAs)
- Arbitrary code from server
- Load 3rd party code
- Login to site?
- Send personal data to server?
- Manipulation by AI curated feed
- Subverted democracy, compromised consensus




Can a better design fix these problems?

Requirements


- Protect against 3rd and 1st party surveillance
- Remove incentives that resulted in surveillance capitalism
- Return data and identity ownership to users
- Take your data between hosts and apps
- Work in existing browsers
- Work offline




File upload




File upload



File upload



File upload



Cryptree format

BATs

fromBase

- SymmetricKey parentOrData
- Optional<SymmetricLinkToSigner> signer
- RelativeCapability nextChunk



64n

fromParent

- Optional<RelativeCapability> parentLink
- FileProperties properties



16n

Inline or List<Cid>, List<Bat>

childrenOrData



4096n


Retrieving a capability (PKI)

1. Use PKI (locally) to look up owner's host peer-id

PKI: $\text{username} \Rightarrow \text{signed}(\text{username}, \text{host}, \text{identity})$

Retrieving a capability (mutable)

2. P2P HTTP request to host to get mutable pointer for writer
3. Verify signature and sequence for pointer
4. Get root hash from pointer



Retrieving a capability (immutable metadata)

5. champ.get(root, map key, BAT) => blocks
(P2P HTTP request)
6. Repeat CHAMP lookup locally with returned blocks
7. Use read key to decrypt cryptree node, and get metadata


Retrieving a capability (immutable data)

8. Get blocks for any chunk fragments using BATs and hashes in cryptree node
9. Concat blocks and decrypt (max 5 MiB)
10. Calculate next chunk's map key =
sha256(stream-secret + current chunk map key)
11. Repeat steps 5-10

Browser app

- special app that renders folders of HTML
- isolates different folders
- internal links (relative)
- external links /peergos/username/path/to/file.html
- works in secret links!
- markdown pages work!

Login




Login security

- humans shouldn't create passwords
- generate password - 7 words from 2048 word list
- generated passwords have $7*11 = 77$ bits of entropy
- GPU can calculate ~1M scrypt hashes per second
- 1 GPU would take 5 billion years
- 1 million GPUs would take 5000 years

Brute forcing a login (after hacking server)

Cost to crack a password in 10 years

Ignoring electricity cost



Social

- follow request to open encrypted channel
- encrypted inbox for follow requests

App structure

- assets/index.html
- peerigos-app.json

With STORE_APP_DATA permission

- data/

App manifest

```
{  
  "displayName": "Painter",  
  "description": "MS Paint clone",  
  "version": "1.0.7",  
  "author": "alice",  
  "launchable": true,  
  "folderAction": false,  
  "appIcon": "icon.png",  
  "fileExtensions": ["jpg", "png"],  
  "fileTypes": ["image"],  
  "permissions": ["EDIT_CHOSEN_FILE"]  
}
```

Open a file of a certain type

- fileExtensions, fileTypes and mimeTypes
- wildcard supported

Permissions

- STORE_APP_DATA
- EDIT_CHOSEN_FILE
- READ_CHOSEN_FOLDER
- EXCHANGE_MESSAGES_WITH_FRIENDS
- ACCESS_PROFILE_PHOTO

Run parameters

Passed via query parameters

- path
- isPathWritable
- theme

REST API

Write and get app-private data:

`/peergos-api/v0/data/path.to.file`

POST a HTML form and store the results:

`/peergos-api/v0/form/path.to.file`

Send async messages to friends:

`/peergos-api/v0/chat/`

Files REST HTTP API

- GET - get file or dir
- GET(?preview=true) - get thumbnail
- POST - create file
- PUT - update file
- DELETE - delete file
- PATCH - append to a file

Chat REST API

```
# list all chats created by this app (GET)
* /peergos-api/v0/chat/

# create chat (POST => chatId)
* /peergos-api/v0/chat/

# get messages by local index (GET)
* /peergos-api/v0/chat/:chatId?from=0&to=100

# send message (PUT - text: message)
* /peergos-api/v0/chat/:chatId
```

Concurrent GC

- Kubo GC with 1 TiB S3 blockstore takes ~24 hours whilst holding a global lock
- V1 of Peergos GC takes 2 hours on same size blockstore, fully concurrent (no locks)
- V2 takes 7 mins!

How does writing blocks work?

1. startTransaction => tid
2. write blocks tagged with tid
3. commit new root to mutable pointers
4. closeTransaction(tid)


GC algorithm

1. List blockstore
2. List GC roots
3. List uncommitted writes (block writes are tagged with a tid)
4. Mark reachable (parallel) (skip raw blocks)
5. Delete unreachable (parallel)


V2 - block metadata

- Store cid => links: list[cid], size in database
- total size ~0.05% of blockstore size
- avoid retrieving and parsing blocks during GC


Bandwidth with S3 blockstore



Direct S3 blockstore reads



Direct S3 blockstore writes



What's in a directory?

Semantically a dir is list[children]

- list[cap]
- list[relative cap] ==> fast revocation
- list[named relative cap] ==> fast get-by-path

list[(name, [writer], map key, BAT, read key)]

Build security

- reproducible builds, both server and front end
- Don't use npm! Only 12 JS dependencies, all vendored
- Have our own simple, deterministic replacement for webpack
- self host all assets
- Most of the client code is written in a type-safe language (Java) and cross-compiled to JS

